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Abstract. XML access control policies involving updates may contain security
flaws, here called inconsistencies, in which a forbidden operation may be sim-
ulated by performing a sequence of allowed operations. This paper investigates
the problem of deciding whether a policy is consistent, and if not, how its incon-
sistencies can be repaired. We consider policies expressed in terms of annotated
DTDs defining which operations are allowed or denied for the XML trees that
are instances of the DTD. We show that consistency is decidable in PTIME for
such policies and that consistent partial policies can be extended to unique “least-
privilege” consistent total policies. We also consider repair problems based on
deleting privileges to restore consistency, show that finding minimal repairs is
NP-complete, and give heuristics for finding repairs.
1 Introduction
Discretionary access control policies for database systems can be specified in a number
of different ways, for example by storing access control lists as annotations on the data
itself (as in most file systems), or using rules which can be applied to decide whether to
grant access to protected resources. In relational databases, high-level policies that em-
ploy rules, roles, and other abstractions tend to be much easier to understand and main-
tain than access control list-based policies; also, they can be implemented efficiently
using static techniques, and can be analyzed off-line for security vulnerabilities [6].
Rule-based, fine-grained access control techniques for XML data have been consid-
ered extensively for read-only queries [10, 14, 13, 12, 2, 16, 9]. However, the problem of
controlling write access is relatively new and has not received much attention. Authors
in [2, 9, 15] studied enforcement of write-access control policies following annotation-
based approaches.
In this paper, we build upon the schema-based access control model introduced
by Stoica and Farkas [18], refined by Fan, Chan, and Garofalakis [10], and extended
to write-access control by Fundulaki and Maneth [12]. We investigate the problem of
checking for, and repairing, a particular class of vulnerabilities in XML write-access
control policies. An access control policy specifies which actions to allow a user to
perform based on the syntax of the atomic update, not its actual behavior. Thus, it is
possible that a single-step action which is explicitly forbidden by the policy can nev-
ertheless be simulated by one or more allowed actions. This is what we mean by an
inconsistency; a consistent policy is one in which such inconsistencies are not possible.
We believe inconsistencies are an interesting class of policy-level security vulnerabili-
ties since such policies allow users to circumvent the intended effect of the policy. The
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Fig. 1. DTD graph (a) and XML documents conforming to the DTD (b, c)
purpose of this paper is to define consistency, understand how to determine whether a
policy is consistent, and show how to automatically identify possible repairs for incon-
sistent policies.
Motivating Example: We introduce here an example and refer to it throughout the pa-
per. Consider the XML DTD represented as a graph in Fig. 1(a). A document conform-
ing to this DTD has as root an R-element with a single child element that can either be
an A, B, J orK-element (indicated with dashed edges); similarly for G. An A-element
has oneC and oneD children elements. AB-element can have zero or moreE children
elements (indicated with ∗-labeled edges); similarly, E and J elements can have zero
or more G children elements. Finally, F , H , I and K are text elements. Fig. 1(b) and
(c) show two documents that conform to the DTD.
Suppose that a security policy allows one to insert and delete G elements and for-
bids one from replacing an H with an I element. It is straightforward to see that the
forbidden operation can be simulated by first deleting the G element with an H child
and then inserting a G element with an I child. There are different ways of fixing this
inconsistency: either (a) to allow all operations below element G or (b) forbid one of
the insert and delete operations at node G.
Now, suppose that the policy allows one to replace an A-element with a B-element
and this with a J-element, but forbids the replacement of A with J elements. The latter
operation can be easily simulated by performing a sequence of the allowed operations.
As in the previous case, the repairs that one can propose are (a) to allow the forbidden
replace operation or (b) forbid one of the allowed operations.
Our contributions: In this paper we consider policies that are defined in terms of
non-recursive structured XML DTDs as introduced in [10] that capture without loss of
generality more general non-recursive DTDs. We first consider total policies in which
all allowed or forbidden privileges are explicitly specified. We define consistency for
such policies and prove the correctness of a straightforward polynomial time algorithm
for consistency checking. We also consider partial policies in which privileges may be
omitted. Such a policy is consistent if it can be extended to a consistent total policy;
there may be many such extensions, but we identify a canonical least-privilege consis-
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tent extension, and show that this can be found in polynomial time (if it exists). Finally,
given an inconsistent (partial or total) policy, we consider the problem of finding a “re-
pair”, or minimal changes to the policy which restore consistency. We consider repairs
based on changing operations from allowed to forbidden, show that finding minimal
repairs is NP-complete, and provide heuristic repair algorithms that run in polynomial
time.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide the definitions
for XML DTDs and trees. Section 3 discusses i) the atomic updates and ii) the access
control policies that we are considering. Consistency is discussed in Section 4; Section 5
discusses algorithms for detecting and repairing inconsistent policies. We conclude in
Section 6. Proofs of theorems and detailed algorithms can be found in the Appendix.
2 XML DTDs and Trees
We consider structured XML DTDs as discussed in [10]. Although not all DTDs are
syntactically representable in this form, one can (as argued by [10]) represent more
general DTDs by introducing new element types. The DTDs we consider here are 1-
unambiguous as required by the XML standard [4].
Definition 1 (XML DTD). Let L be the infinite domain of labels. A DTD D is rep-
resented by (Ele,Rg, rt) where i) Ele ⊆ L is a finite set of element types ii) rt is a
distinguished type in Ele called the root type and iii) Rg defines the element types: that
is, for any A ∈ Ele, Rg(A) is a regular expression of the form:
Rg(A) := str | ǫ | B1, B2, . . . , Bn | B1 +B2 + . . .+Bn | B1∗
where Bi ∈ Ele are distinct, “,”, “+” and “∗” stand for concatenation, disjunction and
Kleene star respectively, ǫ for the EMPTY element content and str for text values.
We will refer to A → Rg(A) as the production rule for A. An element type Bi that
appears in the production rule of an element type A is called the subelement type of A.
We write A ≤D B for the transitive, reflexive closure of the subelement relation.
A DTD can also be represented as a directed acyclic graph that we call DTD graph.
Definition 2 (DTD Graph). A DTD graph GD = (VD, ED, rD) for a DTD D =
(Ele,Rg, rt) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where i) VD is the set of nodes for
the element types in Ele∪{str}, ii) ED = {(A,B) |A,B ∈ Ele and B is a subelement
type of A} and iii) rD is the distinguished node rt.
Example 1. The production rules for the DTD graph shown in Fig. 1 are:
R→ A+B+J+K
A→ C,D
C → F∗
D → F∗
B → E∗
E → G∗
G→ H + I
J → G∗
F → str
H → str
I → str
K → str
We model XML documents as rooted unordered trees with labels from L ∪ {str}.
Definition 3 (XML Tree). An unordered XML tree t is an expression of the form t =
(Nt, Et, λt, rt, vt) where i) Nt is the set of nodes ii) Et ⊂ Nt ×Nt is the set of edges,
iii) λt : Nt → L ∪ {str} is a labeling function over nodes iv) rt is the root of t and is
a distinguished node in Nt and v) vt is a function that assigns a string value to nodes
labeled with str.
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We denote by childrent(n), parentt(n) and desct(n), the children, parent and descen-
dant nodes, respectively, of a node n in an XML tree t. The set descet (n) denotes the
edges in Et between descendant nodes of n. A node labeled with an element type A in
DTD D is called an instance of A.
We say that an XML tree t= (Nt, Et, λt, rt, vt) conforms to a DTDD = (Ele,Rg,
rt) at element type A if i) rt is labeled with A (i.e., λt(rt) = A) ii) each node in Nt is
labeled with either an Ele element typeB or with str, iii) each node in t labeled with an
Ele element typeB has a list of children nodes such that their labels are in the language
defined by Rg(B) and iv) each node in t labeled with str has a string value (vt(n) is
defined) and is a leaf of the tree. An XML tree t is a valid instance of the DTD D if rt
is labeled with rt. We write ID(A) for the set of valid instances of D at element type
A, and ID for ID(rt).
Definition 4 (XML Tree Isomorphism). We say that an XML tree t1 is isomorphic to
an XML tree t2, denoted t1 ≡ t2, iff there exists a bijection h : Nt1 → Nt2 where: i)
h(rt1) = rt2 ii) if (x, y) ∈ Et1 then (h(x), h(y)) ∈ Et2 , iii) λt1 (x) = λt2(h(x)), and
iv) vt1(x) = vt2(h(x)) for every x with λt1(x) = str = λt2(h(x)).
3 XML Access Control Framework
3.1 Atomic Updates
Our updates are modeled on the XQuery Update Facility draft [7], which considers
delete, replace and several insert update operations. A delete(n) operation will delete
node n and all its descendants. A replace(n, t) operation will replace the subtree with
root n by the tree t. A replace(n, s) operation will replace the text value of node
n with string s. There are several types of insert operations, e.g., insert into(n, t),
insert before(n, t), insert after(n, t), insert as first(n, t), insert as last(n, t). Update
insert into(n, t) inserts the root of t as a child of n whereas update insert as first(n, t)
(insert as last(n, t)) inserts the root of t as a first (resp. last) child of n. Update oper-
ations insert before(n, t) and insert after(n, t) insert the root node of t as a preceding
and following sibling of n resp..
Since we only consider unordered XML trees, we deal only with the operation
insert into(n, t) (for readability purposes, we are going to write insert(n, t)). Thus, in
what follows, we will restrict to four types of update operations: delete(n), replace(n, t),
replace(n, s) and insert(n, t).
More formally, for a tree t1 = (Nt1 ,Et1 , λt1 , rt1 , vt1), a node n in t1, a tree t2
= (Nt2 , Et2 , λt2 , rt2 , vt2) and a string value s, the result of applying insert(n, t2),
replace(n, t2), delete(n) and replace(n, s) to t1, is a new tree t = (Nt, Et, λt, rt, vt)
defined as shown in Table 1. We denote by [[op]](t) the result of applying update opera-
tion op on tree t.
An update operation insert(n, t2), replace(n, t2), replace(n, s) or delete(n) is valid
with respect to tree t1 providedn ∈ Nt1 and t2, if present, does not overlap with t1 (that
is, Nt1∩Nt2 = ∅). We also consider update sequences op1; . . . ; opn with the (standard)
semantics [[op1; . . . ; opn]](t1) = [[opn]]([[opn−1]](· · · [[op1]](t1))). A sequence of updates
op1; . . . ; opn is valid with respect to t0 if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, opi+1 is valid with
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Nt Et λt rt vt
[[insert(n, t2)]](t1) Nt1 ∪Nt2 Et1 ∪ Et2∪ {(n, rt2 )} λt1 (m), m ∈ Nt1 rt1 vt1 (m), m ∈ Nt1
λt2 (m), m ∈ Nt2 vt2 (m), m ∈ Nt2
[[replace(n, t2)]](t1) Nt1 ∪Nt2 Et1 ∪ Et2∪ λt1 (m), rt1 vt1 (m), m ∈ Nt1
\desct1 (n) {(parentt1 (n), rt2 )}\ m ∈ (Nt1 \ {n}) vt2 (m), m ∈ Nt2
descet1
(n) λt2 (m), m ∈ Nt2
[[replace(n, s)]](t1) Nt1 Et1 λt1 (m), m ∈ Nt1 rt1 vt1 (m),
m ∈ (Nt1\{n})
vt1 (n) = s
[[delete(n)]](t1) Nt1 \ desct1 (n) Et1 \ desc
e
t1
(n) λt1 (m), rt1 vt1 (m),
m ∈ (Nt1\desct1 (n)) m ∈ (Nt1\desct1 (n))
Table 1. Semantics of update operations
respect to ti, where t1 = [[op1]](t0), t2 = [[op2]](t1), etc. The result of a valid update (or
valid sequence of updates) exists and is unique up to tree isomorphism.
3.2 Access Control Framework
We use the notion of update access type to specify the access authorizations in our
context. Our update access types are inspired from the XAcUannot language discussed
in [12]. Authors followed the idea of security annotations introduced in [10] to specify
the access authorizations for XML documents in the presence of a DTD.
Definition 5 (Update Access Types). Given a DTD D, an update access type (UAT)
defined over D is of the form (A, insert(B1)), (A, replace(B1, B2)), (A, replace(str,
str)) or (A, delete(B1)), where A is an element type in D, B1 and B2 are subelement
types of A and B1 6= B2.
Intuitively, an UAT represents a set of atomic update operations. More specifically, for
t an instance of DTD D, op an atomic update and uat an update access type we say that
op matches uat on t (op matchest uat) if:
λt(n) = A t
′ ∈ ID(B)
insert(n, t′)matchest (A, insert(B))
λt(n) = B λt(parentt(n)) = A
delete(n) matchest (A, delete(B))
λt(n) = B, t
′ ∈ ID(B
′), λt(parentt(n)) = A,B 6= B
′
replace(n, t′) matchest (A, replace(B,B
′))
λt(n) = str, λt(parentt(n)) = A
replace(n, s)matchest (A, replace(str, str))
It is trivial to translate our update access types to XAcUannot security annotations.
In this work we assume that the evaluation of an update operation on a tree that con-
forms to a DTD D results in a tree that conforms to D. It is clear then that each update
access type only makes sense for specific element types. For our example DTD, the
update access type (A, delete(C)) is not meaningful because allowing the deletion of
a C-element would result in an XML document that does not conform to the DTD,
and therefore, the update will be rejected. Similar for (R, delete(A)) or (R, insert(A)).
But, (B, delete(E)) and (B, insert(E)) are relevant for this specific DTD. The relation
uat valid in D, which indicates that an update access type uat is valid for the DTD D,
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is defined as follows:
Rg(A) := B∗1
(A, insert(B1)) valid in D
Rg(A) := B1∗
(A, delete(B1)) valid in D
Rg(A) := str
(A, replace(str, str)) valid in D
Rg(A) := B1 + · · ·+Bn, i, j ∈ [1, n] i 6= j
(A, replace(Bi, Bj)) valid in D
We define the set of valid UATs for a given DTD D as valid(D) = {uat | uat valid in
D}. A security policy will be defined by a set of allowed and forbidden valid UATs.
Definition 6. A security policy P defined over a DTD D, is represented by (A,F)
where A is the set of allowed and F the set of forbidden update access types defined
over D such that A ⊆ valid(D), F ⊆ valid(D) and A ∩ F = ∅. A security policy is
total if A∪ F = valid(D), otherwise it is partial.
Example 2. Consider the DTD D in Fig. 1 and the total policy P =(A,F) where A is:
(R, replace(A,B)) (R, replace(B, J)) (R, replace(J,K)) (R, replace(K,J))
(R, replace(K,B)) (C, insert(F )) (C,delete(F )) (D, insert(F ))
(D, delete(F )) (F, replace(str, str)) (B, insert(E)) (B, delete(E))
(E, insert(G)) (E, delete(G)) (G, replace(I,H)) (J, insert(G))
(J, delete(G)) (D, insert(F )) (D, delete(F )) (H, replace(str, str))
(I, replace(str, str)) (K, replace(str, str))
and F = valid(D) \ A. On the other hand, P = (A, ∅) is a partial policy. ✷
The operations that are allowed by a policy P = (A,F) on an XML tree t, denoted
by [[A]](t), are the union of the atomic update operations matching each UAT in A.
More formally, [[A]](t) = {op | op matchestuat on t, and uat ∈ A}. We say an update
sequence op1; . . . ; opn is allowed on t provided the sequence is valid on t and op1 ∈
[[A]](t), op2 ∈ [[A]]([[op1]](t)), etc. 1 Analogously, the forbidden operations are [[F ]](t)
= {op | op matchestuat on t, and uat ∈ F}. If a policy P is total, its semantics is
given by its allowed updates, i.e. [[P ]](t) = [[A]](t). The semantics of a partial policy is
studied in detail in Section 4.1.
4 Consistent Policies
A policy is said to be consistent if it is not possible to simulate a forbidden update
through a sequence of allowed updates. More formally:
Definition 7. A policy P = (A,F) defined over D is consistent if for every XML tree
t that conforms to D, there does not exist a sequence op1; . . . ; opn of updates that is
allowed on t and an update op0 ∈ [[F ]](t) such that:
[[op1; . . . ; opn]](t) ≡ [[op0]](t).
In our framework inconsistencies can be classified as: insert/delete and replace.
Inconsistencies due to insert/delete operations arise when the policy allows one to
insert and delete nodes of element type A whilst forbidding some operation in some
1 Note that this is not the same as {op1, . . . , opn} ⊆ [[A]](t).
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descendant element type of the node. In this case, the forbidden operation can be sim-
ulated by first deleting an A-element and then inserting a new A-element after having
done the necessary modifications.
There are two kinds of inconsistencies created by replace operations on a production
rule A → B1 + · · · + Bn of a DTD. First, if we are allowed to replace Bi by Bj and
Bj by Bk but not Bi by Bk, then one can simulate the latter operation by a sequence
of the first two. Second, consider that we are allowed to replace some element type Bi
with an element type Bj and vice versa. If some operation in the subtree of either Bi
or Bj is forbidden, then it is evident that one can simulate the forbidden operation by a
sequence of allowed operations, leading to an inconsistency.
We say that nothing is forbidden below A in a policy P = (A,F) defined over D
if for every Bi s.t. A ≤D Bi, (Bi, op) 6∈ F for every (Bi, op) ∈ valid(D). If A →
B1+ . . .+Bn, then we define the replace graph GA = (VA, EA) where i) VA is the set
of nodes forB1, B2, . . . Bn and ii) (Bi, Bj) ∈ VA if there exists (A, replace(Bi, Bj)) ∈
A. Also, the set of forbidden edges of A, is EA = {(Bi, Bj) | (A, replace(Bi, Bj)) ∈
F}. We say that a graph G = (V , E) is transitive if (x, y), (y, z) ∈ E then (x, z) ∈ E .
We write G+A for the transitive graph of GA. The following theorem characterizes policy
consistency:
Theorem 1. A policy P = (A,F) defined over DTD D is consistent if and only if for
every production rule:
1. A → B∗ in D, if (A, insert(B)) ∈ A and (A, delete(B)) ∈ A, then nothing is
forbidden below B
2. A→ B1 + · · ·+Bn in D, for every edge (Bi, Bj) in G+A , (Bi, Bj) 6∈ FA, and
3. A→ B1 + · · ·+Bn in D, if for every i ∈ [1, . . . n], if Bi is contained in a cycle in
GA then nothing is forbidden below Bi.
Proof (Sketch). The forward direction is straightforward, since if any of the rules are
violated an inconsistency can be found, as sketched above. For the reverse direction,
we first need to reduce allowed update sequences to certain (allowed) normal forms
that are easier to analyze, then the reasoning proceeds by cases. A full proof is given in
Appendix A. ✷
In the case of total policies, condition 2 in Theorem 1 amounts to requiring that the
replace graph GA is transitive (i.e., GA = G+A )
Example 3. (example 2 continued) The total policy P is inconsistent because:
– (E, insert(G)) and (E, delete(G)) are inA, but (G, replace(H, I)) ∈ F (condition
1, Theorem 1),
– (R, replace(A, J)), (R, replace(A,K)) and (R, replace(B,K)) are in F (condi-
tion 2, Theorem 1), and
– There are cycles in GR involving both B and J , but below both of them there is a
forbidden UAT, namely (G, replace(H, I)) (condition 3, Theorem 1)
It is easy to see that we can check whether properties 1, 2, and 3 hold for a policy using
standard graph algorithms:
Proposition 1. The problem of deciding policy consistency is in PTIME.
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Remark 1. We wish to emphasize that consistency is highly sensitive to the design of
policies and update types. For example, we have consciously chosen to omit an update
type (A, replace(Bi, Bi)) for an element type in the DTD whose production rule is ei-
ther of the form B∗ or B1 + . . .+ Bn. Consider the case of a conference management
system where a paper element has a decision and a title subelement. Suppose that the
policy allows the author of the paper to replace a paper with another paper element,
but forbids to change the value of the decision subelement. This policy is inconsistent
since by replacing a paper element by another with a different decision subelement we
are able to perform a forbidden update. In fact, the replace(paper, paper) can simulate
any other update type applying below a paper element. Thus, if the policy forbids re-
placement of paper nodes, then it would be inconsistent to allow any other operation on
decision and title. Because of this problem, we argue that update types replace(Bi, Bi)
should not be used in policies. Instead, more specific privileges should be assigned in-
dividually, e.g., by allowing replacement of the text values of title or decision.
4.1 Partial Policies
Partial policies may be smaller and easier to maintain than total policies, but are am-
biguous because some permissions are left unspecified. An access control mechanism
must either allow or deny a request. One solution to this problem (in accordance with
the principle of least privilege) might be to deny access to the unspecified operations.
However, there is no guarantee that the resulting total policy is consistent. Indeed, it is
not obvious that a partial policy (even if consistent) has any consistent total extension.
We will now show how to find consistent extensions, if they exist, and in particular how
to find a “least-privilege” consistent extension; these turn out to be unique when they
exist so seem to be a natural choice for defining the meaning of a partial policy.
For convenience, we write AP and FP for the allowed and forbidden sets of a
policy P ; i.e., P = (AP ,FP ). We introduce an information ordering P ⊑ Q, defined
as AP ⊆ AQ and FP ⊆ FQ; that is, Q is “more defined” than P . In this case, we say
that Q extends P . We say that a partial policy P is quasiconsistent if it has a consistent
total extension. For example, a partial policy on the DTD of Figure 1 which allows
(B, insert(E)), (B, delete(E)), and denies (H, replace(str, str)) is not quasiconsistent,
because any consistent extension of the policy has to allow (H, replace(str, str)).
We also introduce a privilege ordering on total policies P ≤ Q, defined as AP ⊆
AQ; that is, Q allows every operation that is allowed in P . This ordering has unique
greatest lower bounds P ∧ Q defined as (AP ∩ AQ,FP ∪ FQ). We now show that
every quasiconsistent policy has a least-privilege consistent extension P †; that is, P † is
consistent and P † ≤ Q whenever Q is a consistent extension of P .
Lemma 1. If P1, P2 are consistent total extensions of P0 then P1 ∧P2 is also a consis-
tent extension of P0.
Proof. It is easy to see that if P1, P2 extend P0 then P1 ∧ P2 extends P0. Suppose
P1 ∧ P2 is inconsistent. Then there exists an XML tree t, an atomic operation op0 ∈
[[FP1∧P2 ]](t), a sequence op allowed on t by P1 ∧ P2, such that [[op0]](t) = [[op]](t).
Now AP1∧P2 = AP1 ∩AP2 , so op0 must be forbidden by either P1 or P2. On the other
hand, op must be allowed by both P1 and P2, so t, op0, op forms a counterexample to
the consistency of P1 (or symmetrically P2). ✷
Proposition 2. Each quasiconsistent policy P has a unique ≤-least consistent total
extension P †.
Proof. Since P is quasiconsistent, the set S = {Q | P ⊑ Q,Q consistent} is finite,
nonempty, and closed under ∧, so has a ≤-least element P † =
∧
S. ✷
Finally, we show how to find the least-privilege consistent extension, or determine that
none exists (and hence that the partial policy is not quasiconsistent). Define the operator
T : P(valid(D))→ P(valid(D)) as:
T (S) = S ∪ {(C, uat) | B ≤D C,RgD(A) = B
∗
, {(A, insert(B)), (A,delete(B))} ⊆ S}
∪{(C, uat) | Bi ≤D C,RgD(A) = B1 + . . .+Bn, (Bi, Bi) ∈ G
+
A (S)}
∪{(A, replace(Bi, Bk)) | RgD(A) = B1 + . . .+Bn, (Bi, Bk) ∈ G
+
A (S)}
Lemma 2. If uat ∈ T (S) then any operation op0 matching uat on t can be simulated
using a sequence of operations op allowed on t by S (that is, such that [[op0]](t) =
[[op]](t)).
Theorem 2. Let P be a partial policy. The following are equivalent: (1) P is quasicon-
sistent, (2) P is consistent (3) T (AP ) ∩ FP = ∅.
Proof. To show (1) implies (2), if P ′ is a consistent extension of P , then any incon-
sistency in P would be an inconsistency in P ′, so P must be consistent. To show (2)
implies (3), we prove the contrapositive. If T (AP ) ∩ FP 6= ∅ then choose uat ∈
T (AP )∩FP . Choose an arbitrary tree t and atomic update op satisfying op0 ∈ [[uat]](t).
By Lemma 2, there exists a sequence op allowed by AP on t with [[op]](t) = [[op0]](t).
Hence, policy P is inconsistent. Finally, to show that (3) implies (1), note that (T (AP ),
valid(D) \ T (AP )) extends P and is consistent provided T (AP ) ∩ FP = ∅.
Indeed, for a (quasi-)consistent P , the least-privilege consistent extension of P is sim-
ply P † = (T (AP ), valid(D) \ T (AP )) (proof omitted). Hence, we can decide whether
a partial policy is (quasi-)consistent and if so find P † in PTIME.
5 Repairs
If a policy is inconsistent, we would like to suggest possible minimal ways of modifying
it in order to restore consistency. In other words, we would like to find repairs that are
as close as possible to the inconsistent policy.
There are several ways of defining these repairs. We might want to repair by chang-
ing the permissions of certain operations from allow to forbidden and vice versa; or we
might give preference to some type of changes over others. Also, we can measure the
minimality of the repairs as a minimal number of changes or a minimal set of changes
under set inclusion.
Due to space restrictions, in this paper we will focus on finding repairs that trans-
form UATs from allowed to forbidden and that minimize the number of changes. We
believe that such repairs are a useful special case, since the repairs are guaranteed to be
more restrictive than the original policy.
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Definition 8. A policy P ′ = (A′,F ′) is a repair of a policy P = (A,F) defined over
a DTD D iff: i) P ′ is a policy defined over D, ii) P ′ is consistent, and iii) P ′ ≤ P .
A repair is total if F ′ = valid(D) \ A and partial otherwise. Furthermore a repair
P ′ = (A′,F ′) of P (A,F) is a minimal-total-repair if there is no total repair P ′′ =
(A′′,F ′′) such that |A′|< |A′′| and a minimal-partial-repair if F ′ = F and there is no
partial repair P ′′ = (A′′,F) such that |A′| < |A′′|.
Given a policy P = (A,F) and an integer k, the total-repair (partial-repair) problem
consists in determining if there exists a total-repair (partial-repair) P ′ = (A′,F ′) of
policy P such that |A\A′| < k. This problem can be shown to be NP-hard by reduction
from the edge-deletion transitive-digraph problem [19].
Theorem 3. The total-repair and partial-repair problem is NP-complete.
If the DTD has no production rules of the typeA→ B1+ · · ·+Bn, then the total-repair
problem is in PTIME.
5.1 Repair Algorithm
In this section we discuss a repair algorithm that finds a minimal repair of a total or
partial policy. All the algorithms can be found in Appendix B.
The algorithm to compute a minimal repair of a policy relies in the independence
between inconsistencies w.r.t. insert/delete (Theorem 1, condition 1) and replace (The-
orem 1, conditions 2 and 3) operations. In fact, a local repair of an inconsistency w.r.t.
insert/delete operations will never solve nor create an inconsistency with respect to a re-
place operation and vice-versa. We will separately describe the algorithm for repairing
the insert/delete inconsistencies and then the algorithm for the replace ones.
Both algorithms make use of the marked DTD graph MGD = (GD, µ, χ) where
µ is a function from nodes in VD to {“+”, “−”} and χ is a partial function from VD
to {⊥}. In a marked graph for a DTD D and a policy P = (A,F) i) each node in the
graph is either marked with “+” (i.e., nothing is forbidden below the node) or with a
“−” (i.e., there exists at least one update access type that is forbidden below the node).
If, for nodes A and B in the DTD, both (A, insert(B)) and (A, delete(B)) are in A
and µ(A) = “−”, then χ(A) = “⊥”. A marked graph is obtained from algorithm
markGraph which takes as input a DTD graph and a policy P and traverses the
DTD graph starting from the nodes with out-degree 0 and marks the nodes and edges
as discussed above.
Example 4. Consider the graph for DTD D in Fig. 2(a) and policy P = (A,F), with
A defined in Example 2. The result of applying markGraph to this DTD and policy
is shown in Fig. 2(b). Notice that nodes B, E and J are marked with both a “−” and
“⊥” since i) update access type (G, replace(H, I)) is in F and ii) all insert and delete
update access types for B, E and J are in A. For readability purposes we do not show
the multiplicities in the marked DTD graph. ✷
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Fig. 2. DTD Graph (a) and Marked DTD Graph (b) for the DTD in Fig. 1
Repairing Inconsistencies for Insert and Delete Operations Recall that if both the
insert and delete operations are allowed at some element type and there is some op-
eration below this type that is not allowed, then there is an inconsistency (see Theo-
rem 1, condition 1). The marked DTD graph provides exactly this information: a node
A is labeled with “⊥” if it is inconsistent w.r.t. insert/delete operations. For each such
node and for the repair strategy that we have chosen, the inconsistency can be mini-
mally repaired by removing either (A, insert(B)) or (A, delete(B)) fromA. Algorithm
InsDelRepair takes as input a DTD graph GD and a security policy P = (A,F)
and returns a set of UATs to remove from A to restore consistency w.r.t. insert/delete-
inconsistencies.
Example 5. Given the marked DTD graph in Fig. 2(b), it is easy to see that the UATs
that must be repaired are associated with nodes B, J and E (all nodes are marked with
“⊥”). The repairs that can be proposed to the user are to remove from A one UAT
from each of the following sets: {(B, insert(E)), (B, delete(E))}, {(E, insert(G)),
(E, delete(G))} and {(J, insert(G)), (J, delete(G))}. ✷
Repairing Inconsistencies for Replace Operations There are two types of inconsis-
tencies related to replace operations (see Theorem 1, conditions 2–3): the first arises
when some element A is contained in some cycle and something is forbidden below it;
the second arises when the replace graph GA cannot be extended to a transitive graph
without adding a forbidden edge in F . In what follows we will refer to these type of
inconsistencies as negative-cycle and forbidden-transitivity. By Theorem 3, the repair
problem is NP-complete, and therefore, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial time al-
gorithm to compute a minimal repair to the replace-inconsistencies. Our objective then,
is to find an algorithm that runs in polynomial time and computes a repair that is not
necessarily minimal.
Algorithm ReplaceNaive traverses the marked graph MGD and at each node,
checks whether its production rule is of the form A → B1 + . . . + Bn. If this is the
case, it builds the replace graph for A, GA, and runs a modified version of the Floyd-
Warshall algorithm [11]. The original Floyd-Warshall algorithm adds an edge (B,D) to
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the graph if there is a node C such that (B,C) and (C,D) are in the graph and (B,D)
is not. Our modification consists on deleting either (B,C) or (C,D) if (B,D) ∈ FA,
i.e., if there is forbidden-transitivity. In this way, the final graph will satisfy condition 2
of Theorem 1. Also, if there are edges (B,C) and (C,B) and µ(C) = “−”, i.e., there
is a negative-cycle, one of the two edges is deleted. AlgorithmReplaceNaive returns
the set of edges to delete from each node to remove replace-inconsistencies.
Example 6. The replace graph GG has no negative-cycles nor forbidden-transitivity,
therefore it is not involved in any inconsistency. On the other hand, the replace graph
GR = (V , E), shown in Fig. 3(a) is the source of many inconsistencies. A possible
execution ofReplaceNaive (shown in Fig. 7 in the Appendix) is: (A,B), (B, J) ∈ E
but (A, J) ∈F , so (A,B) or (B, J) should be deleted, say (A,B). Now, (B, J), (J,K)
∈ E and (B,K) ∈ F , therefore we delete either (B, J) or (J,K), say (B, J). Next,
(K, J), (J,K) ∈ E and µ(J) = “−” in Fig. 2(b), therefore there is a negative-cycle
and either (K, J) or (J,K) has to be deleted. If (K, J) is deleted, the resulting graph
has no forbidden-transitive and nor negative-cycles. The policy obtained by removing
(R, replace(A,B)), (R, replace(B, J)) and (R, replace(J,K)) fromA has no replace-
inconsistencies. ✷
The ReplaceNaive algorithm might remove more than the necessary edges to
achieve consistency: in our example, if we had removed edge (B, J) at the first step,
then we would have resolved the inconsistencies that involve edges (A,B), (B, J) and
(J,K).
An alternative to algorithm ReplaceNaive, that can find a solution closer to min-
imal repair, is algorithm ReplaceSetCover, which also uses a modified version of
the Floyd-Warshall algorithm. In this case, the modification consists in computing the
transitive closure of the replace graph GA and labelling each newly constructed edge e
with a set of justifications J . Each justification contains sets of edges of GA that were
used to add e in G+A . Also, if a node is found to be part of a negative-cycle, it is la-
belled with the justifications J of the edges in each cycle that contains the node. An
edge or vertex might be justified by more than one set of edges. In fact, the number of
justifications an edge or node might have is O(2|E|). To avoid the exponential number
of justifications, ReplaceSetCover() assigns at most J justifications to each edge or
node, where J is a fixed number. This new labelled graph is then used to construct an
instance of the minimum set cover problem (MSCP) [17]. The solution to the MSCP,
can be used to determine the set of edges to remove from GA so that none of the jus-
tifications that create inconsistencies are valid anymore. Because of the upper bound J
on the number of justifications, it might be the case that the graph still has forbidden-
transitive or negative-cycles. Thus, the justifications have to be computed once more
and the set cover run again until there are no more replace inconsistencies.
Example 7. For J = 1, the first computation of justifications of ReplaceSetCover
results in the graph in Fig. 3 (b) with the following justifications:
J ((A, J)) = {{(A, B), (B, J)}}
J ((A, K)) = {{(A, B), (B, J), (J, K)}}
J ((B, K)) = {{(B, J), (J, K)}}
J ((J, B)) = {{(J, K), (K, B)}}
J (B)) = {{(B, J), (J, K), (K, B)}}
J (J) = {{(J, K), (K, J)}}
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Justifications for edges represent violations of transitivity. Justification for nodes rep-
resent negative-cycles. If we want to remove the inconsistencies, it is enough to delete
one edge from each set in J . ✷
The previous example shows that, for each node A, replace-inconsistencies can be re-
paired by removing at least one edge from each of the justifications of edges and vertices
in G+A . It is easy to see that this problem can be reduced to the MSCP. An instance of
the MSCP consists of a universe U and a set S of subsets of U . A subset C of S is a set
cover if the union of the elements in it is U . A solution of the MWSCP is a set cover
with the minimum number of elements.
The set cover instance associated to G+A = (V , E) and the set of forbidden edges
FA, is MSCP(G+A ,FA) = (U ,S) for i) U = {s | s ∈ J (e), e ∈ FA} ∪ {s | s ∈ J (V ),
V ∈ V}, and ii) S =⋃e∈E I(e) where I(e) = {s | s ∈ U , e ∈ s}. Intuitively,U contains
all the inconsistencies, and the set I(e) the replace-inconsistencies in which an edge e
is involved. Notice that in this instance of the MSCP, the U is a set of justifications,
therefore, S is a set of sets of justifications.
Example 8. The minimum set cover instance, MSCP(G+R , E) = (U ,S), is such that
U = {{(A,B), (B, J), (J,K)}, {(A,B), (B, J)}, {(B, J), (J,K)}, {(J,K), (K,B)},
{(J, K), (K, J)}, {(K, J), (J,K)}, {(B, J), (J,K), (K,B)}} and S = {I((A,B)),
I((B, J)), I((J,K)), I((K, J)), I((K,B))}. The extensions of I are given in Table 2,
where each column corresponds to a set I and each row to an element in U . Values 1 and
0 in the table represent membership and non-membership respectively. A minimum set
cover of MSCP(G+R ) is C = {I(B, J), I(J,K)}, since I(B, J) covers all the elements
of U except for the element {(A,B), (B, J)}, which is covered by I(J,K). Now, using
the solution from the set cover, we remove edges (B, J) and (J,K) from GR. If we try
to compute the justifications once again, it turns out that there are no more negative-
cycles and that the graph is transitive. Therefore, by removing (R, replace(B, J)) and
(R, replace(J, K)) from A, there are no replace-inconsistencies in node R. ✷
The set cover problem is MAXSNP-hard [17], but its solution can be approximated
in polynomial time using a greedy-algorithm that can achieve an approximation factor
of log(n) where n is the size of U [8]. In our case, n is O(J × |Ele|). In the ongoing
example, the approximation algorithm of the set cover will return a cover of size 2. This
is better than what was obtained by the ReplaceNaive algorithm. In order to decide
which one is better, we need to run experiments to investigate the trade off between
efficiency and the size of the repaired policy.
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U I((A,B)) I((B, J)) I((J,K)) I((K,J)) I((K,B))
{(A,B), (B,J), (J,K)} 1 1 1 0 0
{(A,B), (B, J)} 1 1 0 0 0
{(B, J), (J,K)} 0 1 1 0 0
{(J,K), (K,B)} 0 0 1 0 1
{(J,K), (K,J)} 0 0 1 1 0
{(K, J), (J,K)} 0 0 1 1 0
{(B, J), (J,K), (K,B)} 0 1 1 0 1
Table 2. Set cover problem
Algorithm ReplaceRepair will compute the set of UATs to remove from A, by
using either ReplaceNaive (if J = 0) or ReplaceSetCover (if J > 0).
Computation of a Repair AlgorithmRepair computes a new consistent policy P ′ =
(A′,F ′) fromP = (A,F) by removing fromA the union of the UATs returned by algo-
rithms InsDelRepair andReplaceRepair. If argument total of algorithmRepair
is true, then the repair returned by it will be total. If false, then a partial policy such
that F ′ = F will be returned.
Theorem 4. Given a total (partial) policy P , algorithm Repair returns a total (par-
tial) repair of P .
6 Conclusion
Access control policies attempt to constrain the actual operations users can perform, but
are usually enforced in terms of syntactic representations of the operations. Thus, poli-
cies controlling update access to XML data may forbid certain operations but permit
other operations that have the same effect. In this paper we have studied such incon-
sistency vulnerabilities and shown how to check consistency and repair inconsistent
policies. This is, to our knowledge, the first investigation of consistency and repairs
for XML update security. We also considered consistency and repair problems for par-
tial policies which may be more convenient to write since many privileges may be left
unspecified.
Cautis, Abiteboul and Milo in [5] discuss XML update constraints to restrict in-
sert and delete updates, and propose to detect updates that violate these constraints by
measuring the size of the modification of the database. This approach differs from our
security framework for two reasons: a) we consider in addition to insert/delete also re-
place operations and b) we require that each operation in the sequence of updates does
not violate the security constraints, whereas in their case, they require that only the
input and output database satisfies them.
Minimal repairs are used in the problem of returning consistent answers from incon-
sistent databases [1]. There, a consistent answer is defined in terms of all the minimal
repairs of a database. In [3] the set cover problem was used to find repairs of databases
w.r.t. denial constraints.
There are a number of possible directions for future work, including running ex-
periments for the proposed algorithms, studying consistency for more general security
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policies specified using XPath expressions or constraints, investigating the complexity
of and algorithms for other classes of repairs, and considering more general DTDs.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Sebastian Maneth and Floris Geerts for
insightful discussions and comments.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs from Section 4
In this appendix we outline a detailed proof of correctness for our characterization of
policy consistency (Theorem 1). The proof is not deep, but requires considering many
combinations of cases. The main difficulty is in proving that rules 1, 2, and 3 imply
consistency, since this involves showing that for a consistent policy, there is no way
to simulate a single forbidden operation via a sequence of allowed operations. The
obvious approach by induction on the length of the allowed sequence does not work
because subsequences of the allowed sequence do not necessarily continue to simulate
the denied operation.
The solution is to establish the existence of an appropriate normal form for update
sequences, such that (roughly speaking):
1. The normal form of an update sequence a applied to input t is
delete(n1); · · · ; delete(ni); r; insert(l1, v1), . . . , insert(lj , vj)
consisting of a sequence of deletes, then replacements, then inserts
2. The replacements r can be partitioned into “chained” subsequences r1, . . . , rj that
of the form ri = replace(mi, ui1); replace(rui
1
, ui2); · · · .
3. Each ni,mj , lk is in t.
4. No deleted or replaced node (ni or mj) is an ancestor of another of the modified
nodes (ni,mj , lk)
5. Allowed update sequences have allowed normal forms.
Pictorially, a normalized update sequence can be visualized as a tree with some of its
nodes “annotated” with insertion operations insert(u), deletions delete, and replace-
ment sequences replace(u1, . . . , un), such that no annotation occurs below a node with
a delete or replace annotation. Such annotations can be viewed as instructions for how
to construct [[a]](t) from T .
Normalized update sequences are much easier to analyze than arbitrary allowed
sequences in the proof of the reverse direction of Theorem 1.
We introduce some additional helpful notation: write
node(delete(n)) = n
node(insert(n, u)) = n
node(replace(n, u)) = n
for the “principal” node of an operation; write ≤t for the ancestor-descendant ordering
on t (that is, E∗); write ⊥t for the relation {(n,m) ∈ Nt ×Nt | n 6≤t m and m 6≤t n}
(that is, n ⊥t m means n and m are ≤t-incomparable).
Proposition 3. Let P be a security policy and a an allowed update sequence mapping
t to t′. Then there is an equivalent allowed update sequence a′ that is in normal form.
Proof. We first note that the laws in Figures 4, 5, and 6 are valid for rewriting update
sequences relative to a given input tree t. We write op ≡ op′ to indicate that the (partial)
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insert(n, u); insert(m,v) ≡

insert(n, [[insert(m,v)]](u)) if m ∈ Nu
insert(m, v); insert(n, u) if m 6∈ Nu
insert(n, u); replace(m,v) ≡
8>><
>:
replace(m,v) if n ∈ Nt, m ≤t n
replace(m,v); insert(n, u) if n ∈ Nt, m 6≤t n
insert(n, v) if m = ru
insert(n, [[replace(m, v)]](u)) if m ∈ Nu − {ru}
insert(n, u); delete(m) ≡
8><
>:
delete(m) if m ≤t n
delete(m); insert(n, u) if m ∈ Nt, m 6≤t n
ǫ if m = ru
insert(n, [[delete(m)]](u)) if m ∈ Nu − {ru}
Fig. 4. Moving inserts forward
replace(n, u); delete(m) ≡
8><
>:
delete(m) if m <t n
delete(m); replace(n, u) if m ∈ Nt, m 6≤t n
delete(n) if m = ru
replace(n, [[delete(m)]](u)) if m ∈ Nu − {ru}
delete(n); delete(m) ≡

delete(m) if m ≤t n
delete(m); delete(n) if m 6≤t n
Fig. 5. Moving deletes backward
replace(n, u); replace(m, v) ≡
8<
:
replace(m, v) if m <t n
replace(m, v); replace(n, u) if m ∈ Nt, m ≤t n
replace(n, [[replace(m, v)]](u)) if m ∈ Nu − {ru}
Fig. 6. Chaining and commuting replacements
17
functions [[op]](−) and [[op′]](−) are equal; that is, for any tree t, op is valid on t if and
only of op′ is valid on t, and if both are valid, then [[op]](t) = [[op′]](t).
We can use these identities to normalize an update sequence as follows. First, move
occurrences of inserts to the end of the sequence. Next, move deletes to the beginning
of the sequence. Finally, we use the remaining rules to eliminate dependencies among
deletes, replacements and inserts, and to build chains of replacements. The resulting
sequence is in normal form.
Note that most of the identities only rearrange existing allowed updates and do not
introduce any new update operations that we need to check against the policy. In a few
cases, we need to do some work to check that the rewritten sequence is still allowed.
For example, when we rewrite replace(n, u); delete(m) to delete(n) with m = ru, we
need to verify that we are allowed to deletem; this is because we were allowed to delete
n, which replaced m.
We say that two trees agree above n if the trees are equal after deleting the subtree
rooted at n from each. Note that for all of the operations we consider, if op has principal
node n and op is valid on t then t agrees with [[op]](t) above n.
Lemma 3. If t and t′ are equal except under the subtree starting at n, and allowed
sequence a maps t to t′, then there is an equivalent, normalized, allowed sequence a′
that only affects nodes at or above n.
Proof. We show that for each node m unrelated to n, updates applying directly to m
can be eliminated. If a deletion applies to m, then must be an insertion replacing the
deleted subtree exactly, and these are the only updates affecting m. Thus, it is safe to
remove this useless deletion-insertion pair. If a replacement applies to m, then there
must be subsequent replacements that restore the subtree at m. This sequence of re-
placements can be eliminated. No other possibilities are consistent with t and t′ being
equal except at n. Thus, by considering each node m in the tree that is unrelated to n,
and removing the updates having an effect on m, we can obtain an equivalent update
sequence a′ having only updates whose principal node is related to n. This update se-
quence is still allowed since we have only removed allowed operations (and since all of
the operations we have removed are independent of the remaining ones), and can also
be further normalized if necessary.
If t, t′ agree above n, and a is an allowed sequence, then we define the n-related nor-
mal form of a to be an equivalent allowed, normalized sequence of operations affecting
the tree above or below n, which must exist by the above lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. For the forward direction, we prove the contrapositive. As argued
in Section 4, any violations of the above properties suffice to show that a policy is
inconsistent.
For the reverse direction, we again prove the contrapositive. Suppose P is inconsis-
tent, and let t be a tree, a a sequence allowed on t, and d denied on t by P , such that
[[a]](t) = [[d]](t). We consider the four cases for d:
– d = insert(n, t). Consider the normal form of the a restricted to the updates related
to n. Clearly a cannot consist only of updates at or below n since an insertion at
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n cannot be simulated by a deletion or replacement at n or by any operations that
only apply below n. If there is a deletion above n, there must also be an insertion
above n that restores the extra deleted nodes and also has the effect of insert(n, t).
Hence there is a violation of rule 1. Otherwise, if there is a replacement above node
n, then there must be one or more replacements restoring the rest of the tree to
its previous form and inserting t, violating rule 3 (since the chain of replacements
must be allowed by a cycle in some graph GA)
– d = delete(n, t), replace(n, s). Similar to case for insert, since again these opera-
tions cannot be simulated solely by operations at or below n.
– d = replace(n, v). There are two possibilities. If the n-related normal form of a
consists only of replacements at n, then the policy must violate rule 2. Otherwise,
an argument similar to that in the above cases can be used to show that P must
violate rule 1 or 3.
✷
Proof of Proposition 1. By Theorem 1, there are two cases in which a policy can be
inconsistent. The first case can be checked by doing a traversing of the graph following
a topological sorting of the DTD graph. This can be done in polynomial time over the
number of edges and vertices of the DTD graph.
The second case consists of checking if the graphs GA are acyclic and transitive.
Checking this two conditions for each element A can be done in polynomial time. ✷
Proof of Lemma 1. Since both P and Q extend R, we have AP ,AQ ⊇ AR and
DP ,DQ ⊇ DR; hence
AP∧Q = AP ∩AQ ⊇ AR ∩ AR = AR
DP∧Q = DP ∪ DQ ⊇ DR ∪ DR = DR
✷
Proof of Lemma 2. By cases according to the definition of T . If uat ∈ S then there is
nothing to do.
If for some A, B we have uat = (C, op) with B ≤D C, with production rule A
→ B∗, {(A, insert(B)), (A, delete(B))} ⊆ S, then let n = node(op0), let m be the
B-labeled node above m in t (there must be exactly one), and let t′ be the subtree of
t rooted at m. We can simulate op0 by deleting the B-labeled subtree to which op0
applies, then inserting the tree resulting from applying op0; thus, the sequence op =
delete(m); insert(n, [[op0]](t
′) simulates op0 and is allowed.
If for some A,B we have uat = (C, op) with Bi ≤D C,RgD(A) = B1 + . . . +
Bn, (Bi, Bi) ∈ G
+
A (S), then let Bi1 , . . . , Bik be a cycle in GA beginning and ending
with Bi. Again let n = node(op0), m be the (unique) Bi-labeled node above n, and t′
be the subtree of t rooted at m. Let t1, . . . , tk−1 be arbitrary trees disjoint from t and
satisfying tj ∈ ID(Bij ). (The latter sets are always nonempty so such trees may be
found.) Now consider the update sequence
op = replace(m, t1); replace(rtt1 , t2); . . . ; replace(rttn−2 , tn−1); replace(rttn−1, [[op0]](t
′))
This update sequence is allowed on t and simulates op0.
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Finally, if for someB1, . . . , Bn we have uat = (C, replace(Bi, Bj)), whereRgD(C) =
B1+. . .+Bn, (Bi, Bj) ∈ G
+
C (S) then let n = node(op0), let t′ be the subtree rooted at
n. LetBi1 , . . . , Bik be a sequence of nodes forming a path fromBi = Bi1 toBj = Bik
in GC , and choose t1, . . . , tk−1 satisfying tl ∈ ID(Bil). Then the update sequence
op = replace(n, t1); replace(rtt1 , t2); . . . ; replace(rttn−2 , tn−1); replace(rttn−1, [[op0]](t
′))
again is allowed and simulates op0. ✷
A.2 Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 3. We will concentrate on the total-repair problem. The proof for
partial-repair problem is analogous.
First we will prove that the total-repair is in NP. We can determine if there is a
repair P ′ = (A′,F ′) of P such that |A \ A′| < k, by guessing a policy P ′, checking if
|A \ A′| < k and if it is consistent. Since consistency and the distance can be checked
in polynomial time, the algorithm is in NP.
To prove that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the edge-deletion transitive-digraph
problem which is NP-complete [20, 19]. The problem consists in, given a directed graph
G = (V , E) with V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E a set of edges without self-loops, determine
if there exists a set G′ = (V , E ′) such that E′ ⊆ E, G′ is transitive and |E \ E′| < k.
Now, let us define a DTD D and a policy P . The production rules of D are:
A→ v1 + · · ·+ vn
vi → str for i ∈ [1, n]
The policy P = (A,F) is such that A = {(A, replace(vi, vj))|(vi, vj) ∈ E} ∪ {(vi,
replace(str, str)) | vi ∈ V} and F = valid(D) \ A. It is easy to see that GA = G and
therefore finding a repair will consist on finding the minimal number of edges to delete
from G to make the graph transitive. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4. Given an inconsistency policy P = (A,F), Let us assume, by
contradiction, that the policy P ′ = (A′,F ′) returned by algorithm Repair is not a
repair. Since P ′ is defined over D, and by construction P ′ ≤ P , this implies that P ′ is
not consistent. Then, it should be the case that either the changes returned by:
1. InsDelRepair do not solve all the insert/delete-inconsistencies. This implies that
there is a node A with production rule A → B∗ such that (A, insert(B)) ∈ A′,
(A, delete(B)) ∈ A′ and there is at least one forbidden UAT, say (C, op), such
that B ≤D C. Since P ′ ≤ P , (A, insert(B)) ∈ A and (A, delete(B)) ∈ A. If
we prove that there is always an operation (G, op) ∈ F such that B ≤D G, the
marked DTD graph would be such that χ(A) =⊥. Then, either (A, insert(B)) or
(A, delete(B)) would have been in the changes returned by InsDelRepair and
one of them wouldn’t have belonged to P ′. Now we will prove that such (G, op)
always exists. If (C, op) ∈ F , then, (G, op) = (C, op). On the other hand, if
(C, op) 6∈ F then (C, op) is either one of the changes returned by InsDelRepair
or ReplaceRepair:
(a) If (C, op) was a change returned by InsDelRepair, then there was an insert-
delete inconsistency, and there is another UAT (F, op2) ∈ F such that C ≤D
F . As a consequence B ≤D F , and we have found (G, op).
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(b) If (C, op) was a change returned by ReplaceRepair this would mean that
(C, op) was either involved in a negative-cycle or forbidden-transitivity. The
former implies there is another UAT (F, op2) ∈ F such that C ≤D F . Then, B
≤D F , and we have found (G, op). The latter case implies there is at least one
other (C, op2) ∈ F . We have found (G, op).
2. ReplaceRepair do not solve all the replace-inconsistencies: This implies that
there is a node A with production rule A → B1 + · · · + Bn such that one of the
following holds:
(a) There is an edge (Bi, Bj) in G+A for P ′, s.t. (Bi, Bj) ∈ F ′A. If (Bi, Bj) ∈
FA, then ReplaceRepair would have deleted at least one edge from each
justification of (Bi, Bj), and therefore, (Bi, Bj) could not be in G+A for P ′.
On the other hand, if (Bi, Bj) 6∈ FA, then (A, replace(Bi, Bj)) it implies
that it was part of the changes returned by ReplaceRepair. Since both,
ReplaceNaive and ReplaceSetCover check that the final graph has no
forbidden-transitivity, this is not possible.
(b) There is a Bi which is part of a cycle in GA for P ′ and there is a UAT (C, op) ∈
F ′ s.t. Bi ≤D C. Since Bi is in a cycle in GA for P ′, it should be part of a
cycle in GA for P . If (C, op) ∈ F , then the inconsistency would have been
solve. On the other hand, if (C, op) 6∈ F , then (C, op) is either one of the
changes returned by InsDelRepair or ReplaceRepair. By an analogous
reasoning as in cases 1(a)-1(b), this is not possible either.
Therefore, P ′ is consistent and is a repair of P . ✷
B Algorithms
Algorithm 1 markGraph
Input: DTD Graph GD , Policy P
Output: Marked DTD Graph MGD = (GD, µ, χ)
1: Let l1, l2, . . . lk be the set of nodes in GD with out-degree=0
2: for all l in {l1, l2, . . . lk} do
3: markNode(MGD, l, P )
4: return MGD
Algorithm 2 markNode
Input: Marked DTD Graph MGD = (GD, µ, χ), Node B, Policy P = (A,F)
1: for all A ∈ VD such that (A,B) ∈ ED do
2: if µ(B) = “−” then
3: µ(A)← “−”
4: else
5: /* µ(B) is undefined */
6: if (A, insert(B)) ∈ F or (A,delete(B)) ∈ F or (A, replace(B,B′)) ∈ F then
7: µ(B)← “−”, µ(A)← “−”
8: else
9: µ(B) = “+”
10: if µ(A) = “−” then
11: if (A, insert(B)) ∈ A and (A, delete(B)) ∈ A then
12: χ(A)← “⊥”
13: markNode(A)
Algorithm 3 InsDelRepair
Input: DTD graph GD , security policy P
Output: Set of UATs to remove from P to restore consistency in P w.r.t. insert/delete-
inconsistencies
1: MGD ←markGraph(GD, P )
2: changes ← ∅
3: for all A ∈ VD and (A,B) ∈ ED do
4: if χ(A) = “⊥” then
5: Randomly choose either (A, insert(B) or (A, delete(B)) and assign it to U
6: changes ← changes ∪ U
7: return changes
Algorithm 4 ReplaceRepair
Input: DTD graph GD , security policy P = (A,F), Maximum Number of Justifications J
Output: Set of UATs to remove fromA to restore consistency in P w.r.t. replace-inconsistencies
1: MGD ←markGraph(GD, P )
2: if J = 0 then
3: Sol ← ReplaceNaive(rD,MGD)
4: else
5: Sol ← ReplaceSetCover(rD,MGD, J)
6: changes ← ∅
7: for all (A,C) ∈ Sol do
8: for all (B,C) ∈ C do
9: changes ← changes ∪ (A, replace(B,C))
10: return changes
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Algorithm 5 ReplaceNaive
Input: Node R, Marked Graph MGD
Output: Set Sol containing pairs (B, C) where B is a node reachable from R in MGD , and C
a set of edges to delete from GB to make it consistent
1: if Rg(R) := B1 +B2 . . .+Bn then
2: Let GR be the replace graph for R
3: C ← ∅
4: Let stack S contain all the nodes in c
5: while S not empty do
6: B ← S.pop()
7: for all A in VR, s.t. (A,B) ∈ ER \ C do
8: for all C ∈ VR, s.t. (B,C) ∈ ER \ C do
9: /* If there is an edge missing for transitive or if there is a cycle over a node with
a UAT forbidden below */
10: if A 6= C or µ(A) = “−” then
11: Let e be one of (A,B), (B,C) (chosen randomly)
12: C = C ∪ {e}
13: if e = (A,B) then
14: G = A
15: else
16: G = B
17: for all F ∈ VR s.t. F is reachable from G in GR do
18: S.push(F )
19: Sol ← {(R, C)}
20: else
21: Sol ← ∅
22: for all (R,B) ∈ ER do
23: Sol ← Sol ∪ReplaceNaive(B,MGD)
24: return Sol
A B J K
A B J K
A B J K
A B J K
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 7. Execution of ReplaceNaive on GR
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Algorithm 6 ReplaceSetCover
Input: Node R, marked DTD graph MGD , forbidden edges FR, integer J
Output: Set Sol containing pairs (B, C) where B is a node reachable from R in MGD , and C
a set of edges to delete from GB to make it consistent
1: Sol ← ∅, C ← ∅, done← false
2: if Rg(R) := B1 +B2 . . .+Bn then
3: Let GR = (V, E) be the replace graph for R
4: G ← GR
5: while ¬done do
6: G+ ← ComputeJustifications(G, J)
7: /* Algorithm setCoverAlg takes the graph G+ with the justifications and the set of
forbidden edges and returns the edges to delete from GA */
8: Esc ← setCoverAlg(G+,FR)
9: if Esc 6= ∅ then
10: remove edges in Esc from G
11: C ← C ∪ Esc
12: else
13: done = true
14: Sol ← Sol ∪ {(R, C)}
15: for all (R,B) ∈ ER do
16: Sol ← Sol ∪ReplaceSetCover(B,MGD)
17: return Sol
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Algorithm 7 ComputeJustifications
Input: Replace Graph GR, Maximum Number of Justifications J
Output: G+R , i.e., the transitive closure of GR with each edge and node labelled with a set J
containing at most J justifications
1: E ← ∅
2: for all (A,B) ∈ ER do
3: J ((A,B)) = {{(A,B)}}
4: for all A ∈ VR do
5: J (A) = ∅
6: for all A in VR do
7: for all B in VR, s.t. (A,B) ∈ ER ∪E do
8: for all C ∈ VR, s.t. (B,C) ∈ ER ∪E do
9: /* If there is an edge missing for transitivity */
10: if (A,C) 6∈ ER and A 6= C then
11: if (A,C) 6∈ E then
12: E ← E ∪ {(A,C)}
13: J ((A,C)) ← ∅
14: for all j1 ∈ J ((A,B)) do
15: for all j2 ∈ J ((B,C)) do
16: if |J ((A,C))| < J then
17: J ((A,C)) ← J ((A,C)) ∪ {j1 ∪ j2}
18: /* If there is a cycle */
19: if A = C and µ(A) = “−” then
20: for all j1 ∈ J ((A,B)) do
21: for all j2 ∈ J ((B,A)) do
22: if |J (A)| < J then
23: J (A)← J (A) ∪ {j1 ∪ j2}
24: G+R ← (VR, ER ∪ E)
25: return G+R
Algorithm 8 Repair
Input: DTD graph GD , security policy P = (A,F), boolean total
Output: A repair P ′ of P . The repair is total if parameter total= 1, partial otherwise.
1: changes ← InsDelChecking(GD, P ) ∪ReplaceRepair(GD, P )
2: A′ ← A− changes
3: if total then
4: F ′ ← valid(D)−A′
5: else
6: F ′ ← F
7: P ′ ← (A′,F ′)
8: return P ′
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